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Abstract
In this paper, I will examine an evolutionary hypothesis about musical 
expressiveness first proposed by Peter Kivy. I will first present the 
hypothesis and explain why I take it to be different from ordinary 
evolutionary explanations of musical expressiveness. I will then argue that 
Kivy’s hypothesis is of crucial importance for most available resemblance-
based accounts of musical expressiveness. For this reason, it is particularly 
important to assess its plausibility. After having reviewed the existing 
literature on the topic, I will list five challenges the hypothesis is supposed 
to meet. Although my list of challenges does not aim at exhaustiveness, I 
believe that the hypothesis must meet all of the challenges I suggest if it is 
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1. Introduction
Recent research on musical expressiveness has proposed a variety of 
evolutionary explanations to account for our propensity to hear music as 
expressive of emotions. In this paper I will focus on a particular explanation 
first proposed by Peter Kivy.1 I will contend that this evolutionary 
hypothesis should be distinguished from scientific evolutionary accounts 
of the mechanisms responsible for the perception of emotional expression 
in music. A hypothesis similar to Kivy’s is accepted, in one form or another, 
by various contemporary philosophers of music. However, some authors, 
starting with Kivy himself, have expressed skepticism as to its plausibility. 
I believe that these doubts are well founded. Given the importance of 
the proposal in the literature, it is necessary to examine more closely the 
problems it poses. I will outline five challenges, all of which seem difficult 
for Kivy’s hypothesis to meet, at least at the present stage of elaboration. 
Although my list does not aim to be exhaustive, I believe that failing to 
meet these challenges is likely to represent a fatal flaw for the argument in 
question. 
2. Kivy’s evolutionary hypothesis
I shall first briefly introduce Peter Kivy’s contour theory of musical 
expressiveness, for it is in response to the problems encountered by such 
a view that Kivy resorts to his evolutionary story. According to the contour 
theory of musical expressiveness, music is expressive in virtue of its 
resemblance to emotional prosody and other expressive behavior— such 
as the adoption of a certain gait, carriage, or countenance to express an 
emotional state. This general suggestion is not new; it is indeed as old as 
Plato, although Kivy prefers to identify the music theorist Johann Mattheson 
as a closer forerunner.2
Kivy’s novelty lies in his intuition that the emotional quality of the 
music, i.e., its expressiveness, is logically distinct from any actual emotion 
in the listener or in the composer. That is, although music might arouse an 
emotion in the listener and/or have resulted from an emotional state the 
composer was in when he wrote it, the expressive character of the music 
is independent from both the aroused emotion and the emotion felt by 
the composer. In this way Kivy distinguishes the contour theory from both 
the arousal theory of musical expressiveness and the so-called expression 
theory, which respectively identify the music’s expressive character with 
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the aroused emotion and the emotion expressed by the composer. Kivy’s 
famous example to illustrate this is the Saint Bernard dog’s sad expression: 
we readily perceive the sad look of the animal in virtue of its similarity to 
a sad human face; and yet this expressive character is independent of the 
actual emotional state of the dog as well as of anyone’s intention to express 
one’s emotion.3 
At this point, Kivy has to face two kinds of worries. Firstly, one might 
argue that the experience of the resemblance in question is not ubiquitous 
and certainly is not always a conscious one. Although we might point out ways 
in which music is like people expressing emotions, we are not required to 
notice them when perceiving the emotions in the music. We do not normally 
experience music as resembling human behavior, and Kivy is surely not 
interested in producing a prescriptive account about how we should listen 
to expressive music.4 Secondly, if we decide to ground the expressiveness of 
music in the music’s resemblance to expressive utterances and expressive 
behavior, we must confront the objection according to which music does 
not resemble cries, moans, carriages and gaits any more than it resembles 
many other things, such as waves’ motion, the fury of the elements during 
a storm, or “the rise and fall of the stock market or the spirit of capitalism.”5 
But music is clearly not expressive of all these things—although it might in 
some cases be considered to represent some of them. An analysis resting 
only on resemblance might consequently miss the target, and clearly such 
an analysis is the one offered by Kivy so far. 
The evolutionary story has the crucial task of defending the contour 
theory from these objections by (1) providing reasons to believe that there 
need not be any conscious perception of the resemblance between music 
and expressive behavior and (2) explaining why, among the many things 
music resembles, emotional expression is the one we hear in it. 
Kivy’s suggestion is that we are hard-wired to animate inanimate 
objects because of evolutionary reasons. As we are likely to mistake for a 
snake the stick we stumble upon while walking in a wood (we see the snake 
in the stick in virtue of their similarity), we have an unconscious tendency 
to animate music and perceive emotional expressiveness in it (we hear the 
expressive behavior in the music in virtue of their similarity). Because of the 
primacy of the sense of sight, Kivy argues, the perceptual error in the case 
of the stick/snake takes the form of a conscious experience. It is important 
to note how ambiguous Kivy is in the examples he offers for the visual case. 
In The Corded Shell he describes the experience of seeing a human figure 
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in a spoon or a face in a simplified drawing of a circle with horizontal traits 
constituting the eyes, nose, and mouth.6 I will assume for the sake of the 
argument that there is no difference between these two cases, although 
this might be contested. However, in his Introduction to a Philosophy of 
Music he offers the already mentioned example of the stick/snake, which 
strikes me as clearly representing a different sort of case from the other two 
situations.7 This choice of examples is hardly irrelevant, as I hope to show 
later. 
The sense of hearing, Kivy continues, is comparatively less 
important for us as a species, and this explains why the perception of 
emotions in music does not need to be conscious. Whereas we see the stick 
as a snake and are startled, the perception of the resemblance between 
music and the emotions does not produce an instinctive response. It might 
be that things were different for our ancestors: maybe they perceived 
threatening or friendly utterances in sounds as much as we see friendly 
or hostile gazes in the natural environment around us; but the course of 
evolution and the primacy of sight have turned sound animation into a sort 
of “vestigial relic.”8
As we will see more clearly later, Kivy himself came to doubt the 
plausibility of his contour theory. The conjectural nature of the evolutionary 
argument is one of the reasons for this change of mind.9    
3. Ordinary scientific evolutionary hypotheses and the 
specificity of Kivy’s story
I do not question that expressiveness is related to some evolved mechanism. 
We have good reasons to believe that the perception of expressive qualities 
in inanimate objects is grounded in our evolved nature—as most universally 
shared psychological mechanisms and tendencies arguably are. Let us 
briefly consider two evolutionary hypotheses of this kind in order to 
illustrate this last point.
Norman D. Cook has proposed a suggestive ethological explanation 
for the expressive character of major and minor chords.10 It is widely known 
that, at least in Western tonal harmony, major chords are described as 
cheerful, whereas minor chord are perceived as subdued or gloomy. Cook 
believes that, if we look at how major and minor chords are approached 
from situations of musical tension, we might be able to discover the source 
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of their expressive character. He observes, drawing on previous work by 
Leonard Meyer,  that any triad made of equally spaced notes sounds tense.11 
If we accept this narrow notion of musical tension as triads composed of 
equidistant intervals, we can see how the resolution of the tension by 
means of a semitone increase or decrease in any of the notes is going to 
invariably produce a minor chord whenever the semitone increases, a major 
chord whenever it decreases. If we look at ethology, Cook continues, we see 
that humans share with other animals a sort of auditory code according to 
which increases in the fundamental frequency of a sound are linked with 
calls of defeat and submission—whereas decreases in frequency are typical 
of calls communicating victory, dominance, and strength. This frequency 
code carries over into human language—think of the rising tone of polite 
requests and of the descending tone of assertions and commands—and of 
course into music, where we see it operating in the expressive character 
of major and minor chords. I believe Cook’s theory to be implausible for 
a number of reasons, although it is not my concern here to address the 
difficulties it faces.
Another evolutionary hypothesis about musical expressiveness is 
defended by Jaak Panksepp.12 He proposes an evolutionary explanation 
for the sad/bittersweet quality of music containing features such as high-
pitched crescendos or a solo instrument emerging from an orchestral 
background. These musical features are often associated with the sensation 
of chills or musical frissons. Panksepp suggests that the reason for this is 
the similarity between the separation calls typical of various mammals and 
the musical features under consideration. Listening to such music could 
therefore activate ancient emotional circuits deputed to the regulation of 
emotions of paramount importance for social life. 
Neither Cook nor Panksepp argues for or against any particular 
phenomenology of music listening. It might be that, as James O. Young 
seems to believe, Panksepp’s theory could be used to support a resemblance-
based theory of musical expressiveness such as Kivy’s—although I am 
skeptical about it.13 My point here is merely that there is a way of theorizing 
the evolutionary mechanism grounding musical expressiveness without 
committing to phenomenological assumptions about music listening. 
It is true that both Cook and Panksepp accept some basic first-person 
characterizations of music—for instance, that we perceive the major mode 
as happy and the minor as sad. However, the main goal of these theories 
is to describe from a third-person perspective the connection between 
facts related to our evolved nature and facts related to our perception of 
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emotion in the music or to the music’s power of emotional arousal. They 
leave unanswered many of the questions related to the phenomenology of 
expressive music. 
The kind of argument proposed by Kivy is of a more specific sort. 
The main difference resides in the relation proposed by Kivy between 
evolved tendencies and the phenomenology of music listening. For Cook 
and Panksepp, phenomenology is a mere starting point for scientific 
explanations which do not of themselves amount to phenomenological 
claims. In contrast, Kivy’s claim about the phenomenology of music 
listening is quite specific: our way of listening to music involves a reference 
to human expressive behavior, that is, to the sort of behavior that typically 
accompanies emotions in human beings. More precisely, Kivy believes 
that we perceive music as expressive because we perceive it—at least 
subliminally—as an instance of human emotional expression, bodily or 
vocal. 
Kivy’s argument would appeal to theorists who believe that 
the perceptual material provided by the music constitutes the input of a 
mechanism, the output of which is a phenomenal experience necessarily 
involving human expressive behavior. However, his hypothesis is not a 
mere placeholder for future empirical discoveries about the evolutionary 
links between musical expressiveness and the expression of emotions. It 
constitutes a specific claim as to how we should interpret those empirical 
findings: it is in other words a philosophical argument that can be 
questioned without doubting the relevant underlying scientific facts. 
4. Who needs the evolutionary hypothesis?
Needless to say, Kivy’s contour theory needs the evolutionary hypothesis 
if it intends to answer to the two problems presented earlier. As already 
anticipated, Kivy became skeptical about the viability of his contour theory, 
also because of the lack of support for the evolutionary hypothesis on 
which the theory is grounded. He observes: “What evidence, if any, is there 
for the claim that listeners subliminally hear the analogy, if indeed it exists, 
between the contour of music and human expression? And even if they do 
hear it, does that adequately explain our experience of hearing emotions 
in the music as perceptual qualities? As well, does the phenomenon of 
seeing things in ambiguous figures—seeing the stick as a snake, or the faces 
and figures in clouds—transfer to sounds and what we hear (if anything) in 
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them?”14 To these doubts, some of which will be developed and amplified in 
my own challenges to the evolutionary hypothesis, Kivy adds more general 
methodological concerns about ‘just so stories’ lacking experimental 
support.
The interest in outlining challenges for the evolutionary hypothesis 
comes from the fact that various other philosophers need something 
akin to Kivy’s concept of animation in order for their theory of musical 
expressiveness to work. As a first approximation, we could say that all 
resemblance-based theories of musical expressiveness require a story 
about animation such as Kivy’s. We shall now examine this issue in more 
detail. 
Jerrold Levinson observes that there is no way to answer the 
question as to how we come to hear emotion in music, rather than something 
else, except by appealing to “our disposition to aurally construe the music 
as an instance of personal expression, perceiving the human appearances 
in the musical ones, in effect animating the sounds in a certain manner, to 
use a phrase given currency by Peter Kivy.”15 A tendency to animate music 
is also essential to Levinson’s theory of musical expressiveness—the so-
called persona theory, according to which hearing expression in music is 
hearing it as an instance of expression by a musical persona. Moreover, 
we should notice that Levinson needs a hard-wired disposition such as 
the one described by Kivy for the same reasons Kivy needs it. On the one 
hand, Levinson believes that the resemblance between music and human 
emotional expression has a role in our perception of musical expressiveness. 
However, as everything resembles everything else, he has to justify why we 
hear emotions in the music rather than something else. On the other hand, 
Levinson is inclined to stress that the listener does not need to explicitly 
imagine a fictional persona expressing herself musically, as this might well 
only occur “in a back-grounded manner.”16 An evolved tendency to animate 
our perceptions could account for the subliminal character of this process, 
just as it did in Kivy’s case.
Stephen Davies offers a somewhat more cautious and subtle 
analysis of Kivy’s speculations.17 He is inclined to think that Kivy demands 
from his evolutionary story more than is needed. In particular, Kivy 
struggles to justify an asymmetry between the visual and auditory domain. 
This asymmetry is not only implausible, but also unnecessary to his 
argument. It is implausible because perceptual errors such as the stick/
snake case happen in perfectly analogous fashion in the auditory case 
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too—one might be inclined to mistake a click in the dark for the cocking 
of a gun. It is unnecessary because animation, Davies argues, occurs in 
both visual and auditory cases in circumstances where there is no possible 
perceptual mistake involved. When we look at a portrait, we animate the 
portrait and say, for instance, that the portrayed person is looking to her 
left although we are perfectly aware of having in front of us nothing more 
than pigments on canvas.18 Notice that Davies’s revision of Kivy’s argument 
is more detrimental to its original function than it might at first seem. From 
an argument that served, among other things, to distinguish expression 
from resemblance-based representation, we arrived here at a defense of 
the concept of animation that construes it exactly as a case of pictorial 
depiction, that is, a case of resemblance-based representation. Animation 
in the sense Kivy intends is clearly not just the representation of things that 
are animate but rather a genuine experience of facing a perceptual content 
as we face something that is animate.
I will finally note how Davies, who believes that music is expressive in 
virtue of its presentation of emotion-characteristics-in-appearance, seems 
to need something like Kivy’s evolutionary hypothesis for the usual two 
reasons: 1) accounting for the fact that we perceive the music’s expressive 
qualities without being aware of any resemblance between the music and 
human expressive behavior and 2) explaining the salient character of the 
resemblance between the music and human expressive comportment. 
James O. Young, in a recent defense of an anti-formalist philosophy 
of music, has argued that Kivy’s resemblance theory is obviously right and 
supported by both common sense and empirical research.19 Although I 
think Young’s theory is further away from Kivy’s than Young realizes, it is 
worth noting that his account, at least to the extent that it actually is akin 
to Kivy’s, needs the evolutionary hypothesis just as the original contour 
theory did. 
5. Criticism of the evolutionary hypothesis
We have already seen how Kivy himself became skeptical about the 
plausibility of his own evolutionary hypothesis. I shall now briefly 
summarize the criticism found in the existing literature before going on to 
list the challenges the hypothesis should meet. 
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Anthony Newcomb has expressed two worries: firstly, a notion 
such as animation does not leave any space for the composer’s intention, 
as it describes expression as a projection of the listener; secondly, Kivy’s 
view cannot account for all the inanimate properties we ascribe to the 
music, such as “references we commonly hear in it to water, glass, fire”20 
In Sound Sentiment, the second, expanded edition of The Corded Shell, 
Kivy has convincingly dealt with these two objections.21 As to the first 
worry, he rightly observes that the composer’s intention is preserved, as 
the composer intentionally uses musical material that is going to provoke 
some particular expressive animation. In this sense, the link between the 
perception of expressive content and the composer’s choice is no more 
problematic than a painter’s choice of a cold palette to express a desolated, 
downcast mood. In answer to the second problem, Kivy observes that 
his story about how we animate music was meant to explain how we 
come to hear expression in the music; it is therefore pointless to remark 
that it cannot account for descriptions of music in terms of fire, glass, and 
other inanimate substances, for these are clearly not things that music or 
anything else could possibly express. 
Geoffrey Madell has argued that the evolutionary hypothesis 
is not compatible with Kivy’s claim that some musical elements are 
expressive in virtue of conventional association rather than because of 
their contour similarity with human expression—a case in point being the 
expressive character of major and minor chords.22 Madell rightly observes 
that Kivy requires the notion of animation to distinguish expression from 
mere resemblance-based representation: music resembles many things, 
but our evolved tendency to animate makes its resemblance to human 
expression stand out, triggering our experience of expression in the 
music. The problem, Madell observes, is that whereas animation requires 
some sort of resemblance, conventional association does not require any. 
From Kivy’s standpoint, then, it is hard to explain how we perceive the 
conventional expressive character of, say, major and minor harmonies just 
as we experience the expressiveness resulting from the animation process. 
According to Kivy’s analysis, expressive conventions are strictly speaking 
no cases of musical expressiveness at all. Although I find Madell’s objection 
quite compelling, I should note that it is dependent upon the acceptance of 
a theory of musical expressiveness that exploits both resemblance-based 
expression and expression based on conventional association. This latter 
aspect could be rejected and the former could be broadened to explain the 
cases that conventional association was meant to cover. 
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Derek Matravers does not offer any direct criticism of the 
evolutionary hypothesis itself. He notes, however, how Kivy’s concept of 
animation forces him to downplay the role of resemblance in his account 
of musical expressiveness. If music resembles many things other than 
those it expresses, then the experience of expressive music is not the 
awareness of a resemblance but merely our own expressive animation of 
it.23 I am unconvinced by this line of reasoning, as one could reply that the 
evolutionary hypothesis is nothing but a causal story to explain why we are 
prone to notice certain similarities rather than others. Animation does not 
need therefore to be severed from the awareness of a resemblance. 
6. Five challenges for the evolutionary argument
Rather than offering a defense or a refutation of Kivy’s evolutionary 
hypothesis, I will outline some challenges it should be able to meet in order 
to be plausible. I will be mostly concerned with Kivy’s characterization of the 
argument, as he offers the most elaborate one. However, in light of the fact 
that Kivy no longer favors resemblance theories of musical expressiveness, 
it will be particularly important to assess the weight of the challenges for 
accounts such as Davies’s and Levinson’s. 
The phenomenological challenge
We have already noticed how Kivy specifies that  the perception of the 
animated content is subliminal in hearing: we do not hear expressiveness 
in music as we mistake the stick for the snake because sight has a primary 
adaptive importance for us—a fact that keeps the tendency to construe 
resemblances between visible things at the conscious level. It seems to me 
that denying any similarity or convergence between seeing and hearing is a 
way for Kivy to cover up the fact that he is actually dealing with two different 
kinds of experience, both of which involve perception but in very different 
ways. 
Things are further complicated by the fact that the examples Kivy 
offers for the visual case do not fall into the same category as his auditory 
examples. In fact, I believe that the cases from which, according to Kivy, the 
evolved animation tendency stems are of a radically different kind from 
the ones in which we see something in something else (which is what he 
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takes musical animation to consist in). If animating the inanimate means 
seeing a snake where there is only a stick, I agree that there is a reason to 
think this ability might be an advantage. However, I do not believe this is 
what happens in the animation of music. Consider, on the one hand, the 
experience of seeing a snake where there is only a stick and, on the other 
hand, the experience of seeing a smiling face in the front of a car, a face 
in moss, or hearing sad human emotional behavior in music. There seems 
to be more than a mere difference in degree between the first kind of 
experience and the second. In the first case we are dealing with perception. 
Because perception is influenced by personal and cultural values, we might 
perceive one thing rather than another more readily—even to the point of 
committing perceptual mistakes. I am not seeing the snake in the object I 
am looking at, as when I see a figure in a moss pattern. I am simply believing 
that there is a snake, although the perceptual data informing that belief 
could be differently interpreted and lead me to the right conclusion that 
there is no snake. 
We can further stress the difference between perceptual error and 
aesthetic animation if we consider when and how we attempt to justify our 
experiences of things. I can make sure the stick is not a snake by hitting it 
with my walking stick, throwing a stone at it, or stomping on the ground 
to make the snake/stick go away.  But in seeing a face in the grille of a car 
or hearing emotion in music is not a mistake per se—therefore we need 
not do anything to try to justify our perception. The latter is an actual 
case of seeing- or hearing-in.  Mistaking a stick for a snake is not. If there is 
something like a rationale for the seeing-in experience, it would consist in 
pointing out which perceptual aspects of the object (e.g., the grille of a car) 
are relevant to our experience of “seeing-in” (e.g., an upward curve)—albeit 
with the understanding that someone else could experience the same 
object quite differently. To sum up, one can objectively prove or disprove 
a perceptual error; but what I call “seeing- or hearing-in” is a ‘double 
aspect’ experience which can be more or less successfully supported by 
the perceptual qualities of the object under consideration but is otherwise 
subject to voluntary control.
Kivy is of course aware that we do not make any type of perceptual 
error when experiencing music as expressive. He is thus aware of the 
distinction just proposed although he seems to blur it by offering instances 
of both kinds of perceptual act as examples of animation. Once the difference 
is clouded in such a way, it is easy for him to conclude that the evolutionary 
tendency underlying perceptual mistakes straightforwardly applies to 
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seeing-in experiences in which we see something animate in something 
inanimate. 
How is all this relevant to the evolutionary story? The crucial point 
is that Kivy seems to believe that it is the first kind of experience (stick/
snake) which originates the latter (hearing sadness in music). But the 
two experiences exhibit the phenomenological differences which I have 
presented above. By conflating the two cases, Kivy masks his need to 
explain how the evolved tendency to commit certain kinds of perceptual 
errors rather than others has generated our seeing-in abilities. Accepting my 
line of reasoning does not amount to denying that the seeing-in experience 
could have some other evolutionary origin. But Kivy’s failure to bridge the 
gap between perceptual error and seeing-in renders his evolutionary story 
incomplete. 
One might reject my phenomenological challenge from two 
perspectives: 1) we may accept the phenomenological distinction between 
the two cases but find that the tendency to animate the inanimate could 
have developed in one type of situation and then, once established, work 
for the other situation as well in a by-product fashion; 2) we may believe the 
distinction is only a matter of degree.
It is hard know how to address the first position. The fact that Kivy 
offers examples of ‘animation’ so different from one another as the case 
of the stick/snake and the one of the spoon seen as a human figure might 
indicate that this is the strategy he would follow if he were to defend his 
evolutionary story from my phenomenological challenge. We should note 
that Kivy later admitted and discussed the ambiguity of his own stick/snake 
example.24 He recognizes the difference between the case of the stick/snake 
and the case of music which invokes no startle mechanism. He then offers 
further reasons to treat the aural stimulus as something that results in a 
subconscious animation and because of its comparatively lower survival 
value—the startle mechanism is now in the background, as it were. But 
this clearly ignores the fact that the startle mechanism is still in place in 
aural perception (as in Davies’s gun example). Therefore I maintain that the 
actual difference is not between aware and unaware startle mechanisms 
but between two different types of experience—as suggested by the 
phenomenological challenge. The abilities involved in perceptual errors 
(from which the tendency to animate plausibly evolved) are different from 
those involved in seeing-in and hearing-in; and this should be evident from 
my phenomenological description of the two experiences. 
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The adaptation challenge
If we reject the phenomenological challenge for the second reason and 
consider the distinction between the two cases only a matter of degree, we 
can then question the idea that the tendency Kivy described does indeed 
have an adaptive value. Thus far I have offered no reason to doubt that the 
tendency to animate the inanimate is valuable from an evolutionary point 
of view. 
If we claimed that the two experiences are different only in degree, 
such that the animation in the stick/snake case and in the spoon/humanoid 
case are at opposite ends of a continuum, then we may reasonably hold 
that the stick and the snake resemble each other more than the front of a 
car and a smiling face or a wooden spoon and a human figure resemble each 
other, while still maintaining that the cases are not qualitatively different. 
However, if the ‘animation tendency’ is reinforced by natural selection to 
such an extreme degree that it begins to generate ‘byproducts’—like seeing 
faces in the moss—then it could start to work against its own potential as an 
evolutionary adaptation. If there is no limit to how weak the resemblance 
can be between what we animate and the animation we perceive, then this 
‘wild animation’ would only lower our chances of survival. 
Kivy supposes that our ancestors heard emotional expression 
in sounds as we see snakes in sticks. But we clearly need to keep the 
animation under control if it is to be useful. If Kivy decided to defend his 
thesis by claiming that the animation tendency only works up to a point, the 
thesis would lose its purpose. For if the difference between the stick/snake 
and the musical case were only to be found in the relative strength of the 
resemblances between objects and animated perceptions; then because 
music bears nothing but weak resemblances to other things, the perception 
of expressiveness in music would be a very weak version of the stick/snake 
experience (closer to car/smile) and thus contribute little to survival. In 
sum, if the naturally selected tendency always works, we lose the tendency 
to animate; if it works only in clear cases like the stick/snake, we lose its 
power to explain the musical case.
Both the phenomenological challenge and the adaptation 
challenge are related to the phenomenology of expressive music. Do they 
represent a serious source of concern for Davies’s appearance emotionalism 
and for Levinson’s persona theory? An account such as Levinson’s might be 
immune from such phenomenological worries, as it considers the music’s 
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resemblance to expressive behaviors as one of the grounds of musical 
expressiveness rather than as part of its phenomenology. Davies, as we 
have seen, believes that Kivy’s worries about the animation process are 
not justified. We animate things all the time, just as when we see a person 
painted on a flat surface. The problem with this comparison is that it eludes 
the worries about musical animation by pointing to experiences that are 
considerably different from musical ones: when we look at a picture, we 
are typically well aware of the depicted object, which normally is the main 
object of attention. Kivy’s original goal was to provide an evolutionary 
explanation for the characteristically backgrounded, subliminal character 
of the experience of expressive behavior in music. 
The sense modality challenge
Sound animation is relevant to evolutionary adaptation only insofar as 
animated sounds retain informational meanings in the life of an individual. 
It is clear how the tendency to perceive a growl in what is not a growl might 
be relevant for the survival of the individual. Recall also Davies’s example of 
a click in the dark perceived as the cocking of a gun. To draw a connection 
with the visual stick/snake case: better to run away from a stick than to grab 
a snake thinking it is a stick. 
However, in many musical cases the perceived resemblance 
is cross-modal: on Kivy’s account, music can resemble salient bodily 
movements of people who express certain emotions.25 How could such a 
case of synesthetic animation have adaptive value? In order to answer this 
question, proponents of the evolutionary hypothesis need to provide a 
more elaborate explanation than Kivy’s. His hypothesis might be able to 
justify our propensity to perceive the similarity between music and vocal 
emotional expression; but it does not seem to be capable of explaining why 
we perceive resemblances between music and visual emotional correlates 
such as bodily movements. A sound can of course suggest a movement in 
the sense that the movement can be related to it as a physical cause, but 
this is of no help to Kivy’s idea. The problem posed by this challenge could 
be particularly pressing for accounts such as Davies’s, which stresses the 
analogy between music and bodily behavior rather than vocal behavior. 
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The obliquity challenge
It is commonly admitted—even by those who do not accept the cognitivist 
resemblance-based account of musical expressiveness—that descriptions 
of musical expressiveness which emphasize the resemblance between 
music and expressive gestures are legitimate. However, too close a 
resemblance to expressive behavior is normally considered deleterious to 
the purpose of musical expressiveness. The music may well be shaken by 
rhythmical variations and brisk tempo changes or leap through the tonal 
space. But when instrumentalists start to imitate notated gestures too 
closely or a singer’s voice is broken by sadness or screams of pain, it is no 
longer musical expressiveness that we are dealing with but rather some sort 
of musical representation or theatrical device. The perception of musical 
expressiveness seems then to be inhibited by an extreme articulation of 
the resemblance between music and the expressive gesture. The music’s 
analogy with expressive gesture is thus a subtle one, and needs, as it 
were, to be kept concealed. I call this the obliquity condition of musical 
expressiveness. 
I will passingly note that Schopenhauer seems to have been the 
first philosopher to notice this. His account of musical expressiveness is 
deeply embedded in his metaphysics of the Will: it is because of music’s 
relation with the Will that music acquires its capacity to embody feelings. 
The mystery of musical expressiveness is represented by the unintelligible 
possibility of music to represent what is by definition beyond any possibility 
of representation, namely the noumenal essence of the world, the Will. The 
fundamental source of musical meaning is therefore thoroughly different 
from the phenomenal world, hence Schopenhauer’s skepticism about the 
use of ‘painterly’ tricks in music. He writes: “But the analogy discovered by 
the composer between these two [the music and the stirrings of the will] 
must have come from the immediate knowledge of the inner nature of the 
world unknown to his faculty of reason; it cannot be an imitation brought 
about with conscious intention by means of concepts, otherwise the music 
does not express the inner nature of the will itself, but merely imitates its 
phenomenon inadequately.”26
This interpretation of musical expressiveness is bound to cast a 
further doubt on the role of animation. Resemblance is no foe to animation; 
it is actually its greatest ally. The animation of the stick, which becomes to 
our eyes a dangerous snake, is ultimately more vivid and convincing than 
the animation of the spoon/human, and this is because a stick can have a 
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considerable number of visual features in common with a snake. However, 
the obliquity condition implies that resemblance in the musical case has 
to be kept within precise limits if we are to avoid the risk of transforming 
music into the kind of expressive pantomime that seems to be at odds with 
musical expressiveness. A central feature of animation, namely the role 
resemblance plays in it, does not seem to fit well with the role resemblance 
has in musical expressiveness. This constitutes a further reason to doubt 
that animation plays a role in musical expressiveness, at least in the sense 
outlined by Kivy. Davies’s and Levinson’s accounts, to the extent to which 
they do not qualify the sort of resemblance that is supposed to ground the 
experience of expressive music, are also liable to these challenges.
The style challenge
An evolutionary hypothesis such as Kivy’s stresses the role of the automatic 
animation of the musical contour. The hard-wired mechanism to which Kivy 
resorts would seem to predict a strong agreement among listeners from 
different musical cultures as to the expressive character of a given piece 
of music. However, Kivy warns us that things might be more complicated 
than that. He takes as an example the Indian tradition of rāgas. Each 
rāga is associated with a specific rāsa, that is, an emotional state that 
the rāga is supposed to evoke. Kivy has doubts about the expressive 
transparency of this style. He goes as far as to say that “To the uninitiated 
ear, every rāga presents about the same mood: a kind of exotic stupor.”27 
Recent psychological results seem to show that he was wrong: untrained 
Western listeners are rather good at identifying the emotion a rāga is 
supposed to express and arouse.28 Because of his pessimistic view about 
the cross-cultural transparency of expressive music, Kivy needs to explain 
how the hard-wired response could fail to produce common responses in 
human beings sharing the same evolved traits. His solution to this issue 
is ingenious: animating a musical contour might well be an automatic 
response, but the perception of the musical contour is not, as it requires 
experience with the musical system in question. Kivy suggests an elegant 
analogy with the visual domain: “We cannot expect the Western ear to hear, 
ab initio, the expressive contour in Indian music, any more than we can 
expect an Australian aborigine to see expression in Rembrandt’s sketch of a 
face—not because he fails to read the expressive conventions, but because, 
to begin with, he fails to read the pictorial ones.”29 The problem with this 
solution is that it increases even more the distance between the hard-wired 
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case of the stick/snake and the musical case. Not only is the animation of 
the inanimate something different than the startle mechanism at work in 
the case of perceptual mistakes: it is also something that needs training to 
become operational. 
I am not aware of any discussion devoted by Levinson to the issue 
of the cross-cultural transparency of musical expressiveness. Davies, on the 
other hand, has devoted considerable attention to the issue, suggesting 
that the expression of emotions is cross-culturally consistent to an extent 
that encourages a mild optimism as to its transparency, at least while we 
wait for further empirical research.30
7. Conclusion
In this paper I have described two main kinds of evolutionary arguments 
that can be offered in attempt to explain musical expressiveness. The first 
kind, which has not been my concern here, is represented by scientific 
hypotheses about the relationship between music as a perceptual object 
and the widespread human tendency to describe it as expressive as well as, 
in some cases, to be moved by it. The hypothesis considered in this paper is 
of a different sort, as it entails some constraints as to the phenomenology 
of music listening. Peter Kivy, who originally proposed it, became himself 
skeptical about its plausibility. However, it is important to assess its 
value, as the hypothesis surfaces in various ways in recent literature on 
musical expressiveness. I hope to have pointed to some challenges that 
the argument must meet if it is to work as a cornerstone for any theory of 
musical expressiveness. My list does not aim at exhaustiveness. I take it, 
however, that an evolutionary hypothesis such as the one considered here 
would have serious chances of being successful if it could meet all of the 
challenges I have presented.
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